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Abstract
In the stable marriage problem (SM), a mechanism that always outputs a stable matching
is called a stable mechanism. One of the well-known stable mechanisms is the man-oriented
Gale-Shapley algorithm (MGS). MGS has a good property that it is strategy-proof to the
men’s side, i.e., no man can obtain a better outcome by falsifying a preference list. We call
such a mechanism a man-strategy-proof mechanism. Unfortunately, MGS is not a woman-
strategy-proof mechanism. (Of course, if we flip the roles of men and women, we can see
that the woman-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm (WGS) is a woman-strategy-proof but not
a man-strategy-proof mechanism.) Roth has shown that there is no stable mechanism that
is simultaneously man-strategy-proof and woman-strategy-proof, which is known as Roth’s
impossibility theorem.
In this paper, we extend these results to the stable marriage problem with ties and
incomplete lists (SMTI). Since SMTI is an extension of SM, Roth’s impossibility theorem
takes over to SMTI. Therefore, we focus on the one-sided-strategy-proofness. In SMTI, one
instance can have stable matchings of different sizes, and it is natural to consider the problem
of finding a largest stable matching, known as MAX SMTI. Thus we incorporate the notion
of approximation ratio used in the theory of approximation algorithms. We say that a stable-
mechanism is c-approximate-stable mechanism if it always returns a stable matching of size
at least 1/c of a largest one. We also consider a restricted variant of MAX SMTI, which we
call MAX SMTI-1TM, where only men’s lists can contain ties (and women’s lists must be
strictly ordered).
Our results are summarized as follows: (i) MAX SMTI admits both a man-strategy-proof
2-approximate-stable mechanism and a woman-strategy-proof 2-approximate-stable mecha-
nism. (ii) MAX SMTI-1TM admits a woman-strategy-proof 2-approximate-stable mecha-
nism. (iii) MAX SMTI-1TM admits a man-strategy-proof 1.5-approximate-stable mecha-
nism. All these results are tight in terms of approximation ratios. Also, all these strategy-
proofness results apply for strategy-proofness against coalitions.
1 Introduction
An instance of the stable marriage problem (SM) [2] consists of n men m1,m2, . . . ,mn, n women
w1, w2, . . . , wn, and each person’s preference list, which is a total order of all the members of
the opposite gender. If a person qi precedes a person qj in a person p’s preference list, then we
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write qi ≻p qj and interpret it as “p prefers qi to qj”. In this paper, we denote a preference list
in the following form:
m2: w3 w1 w4 w2,
which means that m2 prefers w3 best, w1 2nd, w4 3rd, and w2 last (this example is for n = 4).
A matching is a set of n (man, woman)-pairs in which no person appears more than once.
For a matching M , M(p) denotes the partner of a person p in M . If, for a man m and a woman
w, both w ≻m M(m) and m ≻w M(w) hold, then we say that (m,w) is a blocking pair for M
or (m,w) blocks M . Note that both m and w have incentive to be matched with each other
ignoring the given partner, so it can be thought of as a threat for the current matching M . A
matching with no blocking pair is a stable matching. It is known that any instance admits at
least one stable matching, and one can be found by the Gale-Shapley algorithm (or GS algorithm
for short) in O(n2) time [2]. There have been a plenty of research results on this problem from
viewpoints of Economics, Computer Science, Mathematics, etc (see [4, 14, 9] e.g.).
1.1 Strategy-proofness
The stable marriage problem can be seen as a game among participants, who have true pref-
erences in mind, but may submit a falsified preference list hoping to obtain a better partner
than the one assigned when true preference lists are used. Formally, let S be a mechanism,
that is, a mapping from instances to matchings, and we denote S(I) the matching output by S
for an instance I. We say that S is a stable mechanism if, for any instance I, S(I) is a stable
matching for I. For a mechanism S, let I be an instance, M be a matching such that M = S(I),
and p be a person. We say that p has a successful strategy in I if there is an instance I ′ in
which people except for p have the same preference lists in I and I ′, and p prefers M ′ to M
(i.e., M ′(p) ≻p M(p) with respect to p’s preference list in I), where M
′ is a matching such that
M ′ = S(I ′). This situation is interpreted as follows: I is the set of true preference lists, and by
submitting a falsified preference list (which changes the set of lists to I ′), p can obtain a better
partner M ′(p). We say that S is a strategy-proof mechanism if, when S is used, no person has
a successful strategy in any instance. Also we say that S is a man-strategy-proof mechanism
if, when S is used, no man has a successful strategy in any instance. A woman-strategy-proof
mechanism is defined analogously. A mechanism is a one-sided-strategy-proof mechanism if it is
either a man-strategy-proof mechanism or a woman-strategy-proof mechanism.
It is known that there is no strategy-proof stable mechanism for SM [13], which is known as
Roth’s impossibility theorem. By contrast, the man-oriented GS algorithm, MGS for short, (in
which men send and women receive proposals; see Appendix A) is a man-strategy-proof stable
mechanism for SM [13, 1]. Of course, by the symmetry of men and women, the woman-oriented
GS algorithm (WGS) is a woman-strategy-proof stable mechanism.
1.2 Ties and Incomplete Lists
One of the most natural extensions of SM is the Stable Marriage with Ties and Incomplete lists,
denoted SMTI. An instance of SMTI consists of n men, n women, and each person’s preference
list. A preference list may include ties, which represent indifference between two or more persons,
and may be incomplete, meaning that a preference list may contain only a subset of people in
the opposite gender. Such a preference list may be of the following form:
m2: w3 (w1 w4),
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which represents that m2 prefers w3 best, w1 and w4 2nd with equal preference, but does not
want to be matched with w2. If a person q is included in p’s preference list, we say that q is
acceptable to p. A matching is a set of mutually acceptable (man, woman)-pairs in which no
person appears more than once. The size of a matching M , denoted |M |, is the number of
pairs in M . For a matching M , (m,w) is a blocking pair if (i) m and w are acceptable to each
other, (ii) m is single in M or w ≻m M(m), and (iii) w is single in M or m ≻w M(w). A
matching without blocking pairs is a stable matching. (When ties come into consideration, there
are three definitions for stability, super, strong, and weak stabilities. Here we are considering
weak stability which is the most natural notion among the three. In the case of super and strong
stabilities, there exist instances that do not admit a stable matching. See [4, 9] for more details.)
Note that in the case of SM, the size of a matching is always n by definition, but it may be
less than n in the case of SMTI. In fact, there is an SMTI-instance that admits stable matchings
of different sizes, and the problem of finding a maximum size stable matching, called MAX
SMTI, is NP-hard [6, 10]. There are a plenty of approximability and inapproximability results
for MAX SMTI. The current best upper bound on the approximation ratio is 1.5 [11, 12, 7]
and lower bounds are 33/29 ≃ 1.1379 assuming P 6=NP and 4/3 ≃ 1.3333 assuming the Unique
Games Conjecture (UGC) [15]. There are several attempts to obtain better algorithms (e.g.,
polynomial-time exact algorithms or polynomial-time approximation algorithms with better
approximation ratio) for restricted instances; one of the most natural restrictions is to admit
ties in preference lists of only one gender, which we call SMTI-1T. MAX SMTI-1T (i.e., the
problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching in SMTI-1T) remains NP-hard, and
as for the approximation ratio, the current best upper bound is 1 + 1/e ≃ 1.368 [8] and lower
bounds are 21/19 ≃ 1.1052 assuming P 6=NP and 5/4 = 1.25 assuming UGC [5, 15].
1.3 Our Contributions
In this paper, we consider the strategy-proofness in MAX SMTI, and investigate the trade-
off between strategy-proofness and approximability. In the case of incomplete preference lists,
there may be unmatched (i.e., single) persons. Thus, we have to extend the definition of a
person preferring one matching to another. We say that a person p prefers M ′ to M if either
M ′(p) ≻p M(p) holds or p is single in M but is matched in M
′ with some acceptable woman.
Then the definition of strategy-proofness for SM naturally takes over to SMTI.
Let I be a MAX SMTI instance andMopt be a maximum size stable matching for I. A stable
matching M for I is called an r-approximate solution for I if
|Mopt|
|M | ≤ r. A stable mechanism S
is called an r-approximate-stable mechanism if S(I) is an r-approximate solution for any MAX
SMTI instance I.
Firstly, since SMTI is a generalization of SM, Roth’s impossibility theorem for SM [13] holds
also for MAX SMTI (regardless of approximability):
Proposition 1.1 There is no strategy-proof stable mechanism for MAX SMTI.
Hence we focus on one-sided-strategy-proofness. We show that there is a 2-approximate-
stable mechanism, which is achieved by a simple extension of the GS algorithm. We also show
that this result is tight:
Theorem 1.2 MAX SMTI admits both a man-strategy-proof 2-approximate-stable mechanism
and a woman-strategy-proof 2-approximate-stable mechanism. On the other hand, for any pos-
itive ǫ, MAX SMTI admits neither a man-strategy-proof (2 − ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism
nor a woman-strategy-proof (2− ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism.
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We next consider a restricted version, MAX SMTI-1T. Throughout the paper, we assume
that ties appear in men’s lists only (and women’s lists must be strict). In the following, we write
MAX SMTI-1T as MAX SMTI-1TM to stress that only men’s preference lists may contain ties.
As for woman-strategy-proofness, we obtain the same result as for MAX SMTI, which is a direct
consequence of Theorem 1.2:
Corollary 1.3 MAX SMTI-1TM admits a woman-strategy-proof 2-approximate-stable mecha-
nism, but no woman-strategy-proof (2− ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism for any positive ǫ.
For man-strategy-proofness, we can reduce the approximation ratio to 1.5, which is the main
result of this paper.
Theorem 1.4 MAX SMTI-1TM admits a man-strategy-proof 1.5-approximate-stable mecha-
nism, but no man-strategy-proof (1.5 − ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism for any positive ǫ.
We remark that no assumptions on running times are made for our negative results, while
algorithms in our positive results run in linear time. Note also that the current best polynomial-
time approximation algorithms for MAX SMTI and MAX SMTI-1TM have the approximation
ratios better than those in our negative results (Theorems 1.2 and 1.4). Hence our results provide
gaps between polynomial-time computation and strategy-proof computation.
Coalition. In the above discussion, the man-strategy-proofness (woman-strategy-proofness) is
defined in terms of a manipulation of a preference list by one man (woman). We can extend this
notion to the coalition of men (or women) as follows; a coalition C of men has a successful strategy
if there is a way of falsifying preference lists of members of C which improves the outcome of
every member of C. It is known that MGS is strategy-proof against the coalition of men in
this sense (Theorem 1.7.1 of [4]), and this strategy-proofness holds also in the stable marriage
with incomplete lists (SMI) (page 57 of [4]). Since all our strategy-proofness results (Lemmas
2.1 and 3.5) are attributed to the strategy-proofness of MGS in SMI, we can easily modify the
proofs so that Theorem 1.2, Corollary 1.3, and Theorem 1.4 hold for strategy-proofness against
coalitions.
Overview of Techniques. Since MGS is a man-strategy-proof stable mechanism for SM, such
types of algorithms are good candidates for proving the positive part of Theorem 1.4. Existing
1.5-approximation algorithms for MAX SMTI for one-sided ties are of GS-type, but in these
algorithms, proposals are made from the side with no ties (women, in our case), so we cannot
use them for our purpose. As mentioned above, there are 1.5-approximation algorithms for the
general MAX SMTI [11, 12, 7], which are fortunately of GS-type and can handle proposals from
the side with ties (men, in our case). Hence one may expect that these algorithms will work.
However, it is not the case. The main reason is as follows: Suppose that some man m is going to
propose to a woman, and the head of m’s current list is a tie, which is a mixture of unmatched
and matched women. In this case, m’s proposal will be sent to an unmatched woman, say w.
Suppose that, just one step before, another man m′ has proposed to w′. Then if m′ moves w
to the position just before w′, he can make w already matched when m is about to propose to
her, and as a result of this, m does not propose to w but to another unmatched woman. In
this way, a man can change another man’s proposal order, which destroys the strategy-proofness
(see Appendix B for more details). To overcome it, we modify an existing 1.5-approximation
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algorithm to be robust in the sense that a man’s proposal order is not affected by other men’s
preference lists.
Ties or Incomplete Lists. When only ties are present (SMT) or only incomplete lists are
present (SMI), all the stable matchings of one instance have the same cardinality. The former is
due to the fact that any stable matching is a perfect matching, and the latter is due to the Rural
Hospitals theorem [3]. Hence approximability is not an important issue in these cases. As for
strategy-proofness, since SMT and SMI are generalizations of SM, Roth’s impossibility theorem
holds and no strategy-proof stable mechanism exists. Existence of one-sided strategy-proofness
for SMI is already known as we have mentioned in “Coalition” part above, and that for SMT
follows directly from Theorem 1.2.
2 Results for MAX SMTI
In this section, we give a proof of Theorem 1.2. We start with the positive part:
Lemma 2.1 MAX SMTI admits both a man-strategy-proof 2-approximate-stable mechanism
and a woman-strategy-proof 2-approximate-stable mechanism.
Proof. Consider a mechanism S∗ that is described by the following algorithm. Given a MAX
SMTI instance I, S∗ first breaks each tie so that persons in a tie are ordered increasingly in their
indices, that is, if qi and qj are in the same tie of p’s list, then after the tie break qi ≻p qj holds if
and only if i < j. (This ordering is only for the purpose of making the algorithm deterministic,
so any fixed tie-breaking rule is valid.) Let I ′ be the resulting instance. Its preference lists are
incomplete but do not include ties; such an instance is called an SMI instance. It then applies
MGS modified for SMI [4] to I ′ and obtains a stable matching M for I ′. It is easy to see that M
is stable for I. Also it is well-known that in MAX SMTI, any stable matching is a 2-approximate
solution [10]. Hence S∗ is a 2-approximate-stable mechanism.
We then show that S∗ is a man-strategy-proof mechanism for MAX SMTI. Suppose not.
Then there is a MAX SMTI instance I and a man m who has a successful strategy in I. Let
J be a MAX SMTI instance in which only m’s preference list differs from I, and by using it m
obtains a better outcome. Let MI and MJ be the outputs of S
∗ on I and J , respectively. Then
m prefers MJ to MI , that is, either (i) MJ (m) ≻m MI(m) with respect to m’s true preference
list in I, or (ii) m is single in MI and matched in MJ , and MJ(m) is acceptable to m in I. Let
I ′ and J ′, respectively, be the SMI-instances constructed from I and J by breaking ties in the
above mentioned manner. Then MI and MJ are, respectively, the results of MGS applied to I
′
and J ′. Since I ′ is the result of tie-breaking of I and m prefers MJ to MI in I, m prefers MJ to
MI in I
′. Note that, due to the tie-breaking rule, the preference lists of people except for m are
same in I ′ and J ′. This means that when MGS is used in SMI, m can have a successful strategy
in I ′ (i.e., to change his list to that of J ′),contradicting to the man-strategy-proofness of MGS
for SMI (page 57 of [4]).
If we exchange the roles of men and women in S∗, we obtain a woman-strategy-proof 2-
approximate-stable mechanism.
We then show the negative part. We remark that ǫ is not necessarily a constant.
Lemma 2.2 For any positive ǫ, MAX SMTI admits neither a man-strategy-proof (2 − ǫ)-
approximate-stable mechanism nor a woman-strategy-proof (2 − ǫ)-approximate-stable mecha-
nism.
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Proof. Consider the instance I1 given in Fig. 1, where m3’s preference list is empty. It is
straightforward to verify that I1 has two stable matchings M1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)} and M2 =
{(m1, w2), (m2, w3)}, both of which are of maximum size. Hence any stable mechanism must
output either M1 or M2.
m1: w2 w1 w1: m1
m2: w2 w3 w2: (m1 m2)
m3: w3: m2
Figure 1: A MAX SMTI instance I1
First, consider an arbitrary (2 − ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism S for MAX SMTI that
outputs M1 on I1. Let I
′
1
be the instance obtained from I1 by deleting w1 from m1’s preference
list. Then since M2 is still a stable matching for I
′
1 and S is a (2 − ǫ)-approximate-stable
mechanism, S must output a stable matching of size 2. But since M2 is now the only stable
matching of size 2, S outputs M2 on I
′
1. Thus m1 can obtain a better partner by manipulating
his preference list. Next, consider a (2 − ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism S that outputs M2
on I1. Then let I
′′
1 be the instance obtained from I1 by deleting w3 from m2’s preference list.
By a similar argument, S must output M1 on I
′′
1 and hence m2 can obtain a better partner by
manipulation. We have shown that, for any (2− ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism S, some man
has a successful strategy in I1 and hence S is not a man-strategy-proof mechanism.
Next we use the instance I2 given in Fig. 2, which is symmetric to I1. By the same argument
as above, we can show that for any (2− ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism S, some woman has
a successful strategy in I2 and hence S is not a woman-strategy-proof mechanism.
m1: w1 w1: m2 m1
m2: (w1 w2) w2: m2 m3
m3: w2 w3:
Figure 2: A MAX SMTI instance I2
Therefore, we have shown that any (2− ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism is neither a man-
strategy-proof mechanism nor a woman-strategy-proof mechanism.
3 Results for MAX SMTI-1TM
Recall that, in a MAX SMTI-1TM instance, ties can appear in men’s lists only. Since I2 in the
proof of Lemma 2.2 is a MAX SMTI-1TM instance, the second half of the proof applies also to
MAX SMTI-1TM. Consequently, together with Lemma 2.1, we have Corollary 1.3.
We then move to man-strategy-proofness and give a proof for Theorem 1.4. We start with
the negative part:
Lemma 3.1 For any positive ǫ, there is no man-strategy-proof (1.5 − ǫ)-approximate-stable
mechanism for MAX SMTI-1TM.
Proof. The proof goes like that of Lemma 2.2. Consider the instance I3 in
Fig. 3. I3 has four matchings of size 3, namely, M3 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)},
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M4 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w4)}, M5 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w4)}, and M6 =
{(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w4)}. Among them, M3 and M6 are stable (M4 is blocked by (m3, w3)
and M5 is blocked by (m1, w2)). Hence any (1.5 − ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism outputs
either M3 or M6, since a stable matching of size 2 is not a (1.5− ǫ)-approximate solution.
m1: w2 w1 w1: m1
m2: (w2 w3) w2: m2 m1
m3: w3 w4 w3: m2 m3
m4: w4: m3
Figure 3: A MAX SMTI-1TM instance I3
Consider an arbitrary (1.5− ǫ)-approximate-stable mechanism S for MAX SMTI-1TM, and
suppose that S outputsM3 on I3. Then ifm1 deletes w1 from the list,M6 is the unique maximum
stable matching (of size 3); hence S must output M6 and so m1 can obtain a better partner w2.
Similarly, if S outputs M6 on I3, m3 can force S to output M3 by deleting w4 from the list. In
either case, some man has a successful strategy in I3 and hence S is not a man-strategy-proof
mechanism.
Finally, we give a proof for the positive part, which is the main result of this paper.
Lemma 3.2 There exists a man-strategy-proof 1.5-approximate-stable mechanism for MAX
SMTI-1TM.
Proof. We give Algorithm 1 and show that it is a man-strategy-proof 1.5-approximate-stable
mechanism by three subsequent lemmas (Lemmas 3.3–3.5). Algorithm 1 first translates an
SMTI-1TM instance I to an SMI instance I ′ using Algorithm 2, then applies MGS to I ′ and
obtains a matching M ′, and finally constructs a matching M of I from M ′. It is worth noting
that a man bj created at Step 2 of Algorithm 2 corresponds to a woman (not a man) of I. As
will be seen later, bj is definitely matched with sj or tj in M
′, and the other woman (i.e., either
sj or tj who is not matched with bj) plays a role of woman wj of I: If she is single in M
′, then
wj is single in M . If she is matched with ai in M
′, then wj is matched with mi in M .
Algorithm 1 An algorithm for MAX SMTI-1TM
Input: An instance I for MAX SMTI-1TM.
Output: A matching M for I.
1: Construct an SMI instance I ′ from I using Algorithm 2.
2: Apply MGS to I ′ and obtain a matching M ′.
3: Let M := {(mi, wj) | (ai, sj) ∈M
′ ∨ (ai, tj) ∈M
′} and output M .
Now we start formal proofs for the correctness.
Lemma 3.3 Algorithm 1 always outputs a stable matching.
Proof. Let M be the output of Algorithm 1 and M ′ be the matching obtained at Step 2 of
Algorithm 1. We first show that M is a matching. Since M ′ is a matching, ai appears at most
once in M ′, so mi appears at most once in M . Observe that bj is matched in M
′, as otherwise
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Algorithm 2 Translating instances
Input: An instance I for MAX SMTI-1TM.
Output: An instance I ′ for SMI.
1: Let X and Y be the sets of men and women of I, respectively.
2: Let X ′ := {ai | mi ∈ X} ∪ {bj | wj ∈ Y } be the set of men of I
′.
3: Let Y ′ := {sj | wj ∈ Y } ∪ {tj | wj ∈ Y } be the set of women of I
′.
4: Each ai’s list is constructed as follows: Consider a tie (wj1 wj2 · · · wjk) in mi’s list in I. We
assume without loss of generality that j1 < j2 < · · · < jk. (If not, just arrange the order,
which does not change the instance.) Replace each tie (wj1 wj2 · · · wjk) by a strict order of
2k women tj1 tj2 · · · tjk sj1 sj2 · · · sjk . A woman who is not included in a tie is considered
as a tie of length one.
5: Each bj’s list is defined as “bj : sj tj”.
6: For each j, let P (wj) be the list of wj in I, and Q(wj) be the list obtained from P (wj) by
replacing each man mi by ai. Then sj and tj ’s lists are defined as follows:
sj : Q(wj) bj
tj : bj Q(wj)
(bj , tj) blocks M
′, contradicting the stability of M ′ in I ′. Hence at most one of sj and tj can
be matched with ai for some i, which implies that wj appears at most once in M . Thus M is a
matching.
We then show the stability of M . Since M ′ is the output of MGS, it is stable in I ′. Now
suppose that M is unstable in I and there is a blocking pair (mi, wj) for M . There are four
cases:
Case (i): both mi and wj are single. Sincemi is single inM , Step 3 of Algorithm 1 implies
that ai is single in M
′. Since wj is single in M , sj is not matched in M
′ with anyone in
Q(wj), i.e., sj is single or matched with bj. Note that (ai, sj) is a mutually acceptable
pair because (mi, wj) is a blocking pair, and ai ≻sj bj in I
′ by construction. Thus (ai, sj)
blocks M ′, a contradiction.
Case (ii): wj ≻mi M(mi) and wj is single. Let M(mi) = wk. Then, by construction of
M , M ′(ai) is either sk or tk. By construction of I
′, wj ≻mi wk implies both sj ≻ai sk and
sj ≻ai tk, and in either case we have that sj ≻ai M
′(ai) in I
′. Since wj is single in M , by
the same argument as Case (i), sj is either single or matched with bj in M
′. Hence (ai, sj)
blocks M ′.
Case (iii): mi is single and mi ≻wj M(wj). Since mi is single in M , ai is single in M
′ by
the same argument as Case (i). Let M(wj) = mk. Then, by construction of M , either sj
or tj is matched with ak, and the other is matched with bj since bj can never be single
as we have seen in an earlier stage of this proof. That is, M ′(sj) is either ak or bj . Note
that mi ≻wj mk in P (wj) implies ai ≻sj ak in Q(wj), so in either case ai ≻sj M
′(sj) in I
′.
Therefore (ai, sj) blocks M
′.
Case (iv): wj ≻mi M(mi) and mi ≻wj M(wj). By the same argument as Case (ii), we
have that sj ≻ai M
′(ai) in I
′. By the same argument as Case (iii), we have that ai ≻sj
M ′(sj) in I
′. Hence (ai, sj) blocks M
′.
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Lemma 3.4 Algorithm 1 always outputs a 1.5-approximate solution.
Proof. Let I be an input, Mopt be a maximum stable matching for I, and M be the output of
Algorithm 1. We show that
|Mopt|
|M | ≤ 1.5. Let G = (X ∪ Y,E) be a bipartite (multi-)graph with
vertex bipartition X and Y , where X corresponds to men and Y corresponds to women of I.
The edge set E is a union of M and Mopt, that is, (mi, wj) ∈ E if and only if (mi, wj) is a pair in
M or Mopt. If (mi, wj) is a pair in both M and Mopt, then E contains two edges (mi, wj), which
constitute a “cycle” of length two. An edge in E corresponding to M (resp. Mopt) is called an
M -edge (resp. Mopt-edge). Since the degree of each vertex of G is at most 2, each connected
component of G is an isolated vertex, a cycle, or a path.
It is easy to see that G does not contain a single Mopt-edge as a connected component, since
if such an edge (mi, wj) exists, then (mi, wj) is a blocking pair for M , contradicting the stability
of M . In the following, we show that G does not contain, as a connected component, a path of
length three mi−wj −mk −wℓ such that (mi, wj) and (mk, wℓ) are Mopt-edges and (mk, wj) is
an M -edge. If this is true, then for any connected component C of G, the number of M -edges
in C is at least two-thirds of the number of Mopt-edges in C, implying
|Mopt|
|M | ≤ 1.5.
Suppose that such a path exists. Note that mi and wℓ are single in M . If mi ≻wj mk, then
(mi, wj) blocks M . Since women’s preference lists do not contain ties, we have that mk ≻wj mi.
If wℓ ≻mk wj , then (mk, wℓ) blocks M . If wj ≻mk wℓ, then (mk, wj) blocks Mopt. Hence wj and
wℓ are tied in mk’s list. Then by construction of I
′, (i) tℓ ≻ak sj . (Hereafter, referring to Fig. 4
would be helpful. Here, the order of tj and tℓ in ak’s list is uncertain, i.e., it may be the opposite,
but this order is not important in the rest of the proof.) Since wℓ is single in M , either sℓ or
tℓ is single in M
′. If sℓ is single in M
′, then (bℓ, sℓ) blocks M
′, a contradiction. Hence (ii) tℓ is
single in M ′. Since M(mk) = wj , either M
′(ak) = sj or M
′(ak) = tj holds. In the former case,
(i) and (ii) above imply that (ak, tℓ) blocks M
′, so assume the latter, i.e., M ′(ak) = tj. Recall
that either sj or tj is matched with bj in M
′, so M ′(sj) = bj. Since (mi, wj) is an acceptable
pair in I, we have that ai ≻sj bj . Since mi is single in M , ai is single in M
′. Hence (ai, sj)
blocks M ′, a contradiction.
ai: · · · sj · · · sj: · · · ai · · · bj
bi: si ti tj : bj · · · ak · · ·
ak: · · · tj · · · tℓ · · · sj · · · sℓ: · · · bℓ
bk: sk tk tℓ: bℓ · · ·
aℓ: · · ·
bℓ: sℓ tℓ
Figure 4: A part of the preference lists of I ′
Lemma 3.5 Algorithm 1 is a man-strategy-proof mechanism.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2.1. Suppose that Algorithm 1 is not a man-
strategy-proof mechanism. Then there are MAX SMTI-1TM instances I and J and a man mi
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having the following properties: I and J differ in only mi’s preference list, and mi prefers MJ
to MI , where MI and MJ are the outputs of Algorithm 1 for I and J , respectively. Then either
(i) MJ(mi) ≻mi MI(mi) in I, or (ii) mi is single in MI and MJ(mi) is acceptable to mi in I.
Let I ′ and J ′ be the SMI-instances constructed by Algorithm 2. Since I and J differ in only
mi’s preference list, I
′ and J ′ differ in only ai’s preference list. Let MI′ and MJ ′ , respectively,
be the outputs of MGS applied to I ′ and J ′. In case of (i), we have that MJ ′(ai) ≻ai MI′(ai) in
I ′, due to Algorithm 2 and Step 3 of Algorithm 1. In case of (ii), ai is single in MI′ because mi
is single in MI , and MJ ′(ai) is acceptable to ai in I
′ because MJ(mi) is acceptable to mi in I.
This implies that ai has a successful strategy in I
′, contradicting to the man-strategy-proofness
of MGS for SMI [4].
By Lemmas 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, we can conclude that Algorithm 1 is a man-strategy-proof
1.5-approximate-stable mechanism for MAX SMTI-1TM.
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A The Man-Oriented Gale-Shapley Algorithm
During the course of the algorithm, each person takes one of two states “free” and “engaged”.
At the beginning, everyone is free and the matching M is initialized to the empty set. At one
step of the algorithm, an arbitrary free man m proposes to the top woman w in his current
list. If w is free, then m and w are provisionally matched and (m,w) is added to M . If w is
engaged and matched with m′, then w compares m and m′, takes the preferred one, and rejects
the other. The rejected man deletes w from the list and becomes (or keeps to be) free. When
there is no free man, the matching M is output. The pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 The man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm
1: Let M := ∅ and all people be free.
2: while there is a free man whose preference list is non-empty do
3: Let m be any free man.
4: Let w be the woman at the top of m’s (current) list.
5: if w is free then
6: Let M :=M ∪ {(m,w)}, and m and w be engaged.
7: end if
8: if w is engaged then
9: Let m′ be w’s partner.
10: if w prefers m′ to m then
11: Delet w from m’s list.
12: else
13: Let M :=M ∪ {(m,w)} \ {(m′, w)}.
14: Let m′ be free and m be engaged.
15: Delete w from m′’s list.
16: end if
17: end if
18: end while
19: Output M .
B Non-Strategy-Proofness of Existing 1.5-approximation Algo-
rithms for MAX SMTI-1TM
Kira´ly [7] presented a 1.5-approximation algorithm for general MAX SMTI (i.e., ties can appear
on both sides). We modify it in the following two respects.
1. Men’s proposals do not get into the 2nd round.
2. When there is arbitrarity, the person with the smallest index is prioritized.
Ideas behind these modifications are as follows: For item 1, since there is no ties in women’s
preference lists, executing the 2nd round does not change the result. The role of item 2 is to
make the algorithm deterministic, so that the output is a function of an input (as we did in the
proof of Lemma 2.1). For completeness, we give a pseudo-code of the algorithm in Algorithm 4.
This algorithm is called “New Algorithm” in [7], so we abbreviate it as NA here.
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Each person takes one of three states, “free”, “engaged”, and “semi-engaged”. Initially,
all the persons are free. At lines 5, 10, and 14, man m proposes to woman w. Basically, the
procedure is exactly the same as that of MGS. If w is free, then we let M := M ∪ {(m,w)} and
both m and w be engaged (we say w accepts m). If w is engaged to m′ (i.e., (m′, w) ∈ M) and
if m ≻w m
′, then we let M := M ∪ {(m,w)} \ {(m′, w)}, m be engaged, and m′ be free. We
also delete w from m′’s preference list (we say w accepts m and rejects m′). If w is engaged to
m′ and m′ ≻w m, then we delete w from m’s preference list (we say w rejects m).
Algorithm 4 Kira´ly’s New Algorithm (NA) [7]
1: Let M := ∅ and all people be free.
2: while there is a free man whose preference list is non-empty do
3: Among those men, let m be the one with the smallest index.
4: if the top of m’s current preference list consists of only one woman w then
5: Let m propose to w.
6: end if
7: if the top of m’s current preference list is a tie then
8: if all women in the tie are engaged then
9: Among those women, let w be the one with the smallest index.
10: Let m propose to w.
11: end if
12: if there is a free woman in the tie then
13: Among those free women, let w be the one with the smallest index.
14: Let m propose to w.
15: end if
16: end if
17: end while
18: Output M .
There is an exception in the acceptance/rejection rule of a woman, when she receives the
first and second proposals. This is actually the key for guaranteeing 1.5-approximation, but this
rule is not used in the subsequent counter-example so we omit it here. Readers may consult to
the original papers for the full description of the algorithm.
It is already proved that the (original) Kira´ly’s algorithm always outputs a stable matching
and it is a 1.5-approximate solution, and it is not hard to see that the same results hold for the
above NA for MAX SMTI-1TM. However, as the example in Figures 5 and 6 shows, it is not a
man-strategy-proof mechanism.
m1: w2 w1 w1: m2 m4 m1
m2: (w1 w3) w2: m4 m1
m3: w3 w3: m2 m3
m4: w1 w2 w4:
Figure 5: A counter-example (true lists)
If NA is applied to the true preference lists in Figure 5, the obtained matching is
{(m2, w1), (m3, w3), (m4, w2)}. Suppose that m1 flips the order of w1 and w2 (Figure 6). This
time, NA outputs {(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m4, w1)} and m1 successfully obtains a partner w2. By
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m1: w1 w2 w1: m2 m4 m1
m2: (w1 w3) w2: m4 m1
m3: w3 w3: m2 m3
m4: w1 w2 w4:
Figure 6: A counter-example (manipulated by m1)
proposing to w1 first, m1 is able to let m2 propose to w3. This allows m4 to obtain w1, which
prevents m4 from proposing to w2. This eventually makes it possible for m1 to obtain w2.
We finally remark that the same example shows that the other two 1.5-approximation al-
gorithms [11, 12] (with the tie-breaking rule 2 above) are not man-strategy-proof mechanisms
either.
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